Deep brief — Force Majeure Tracker

Day 81 of crisis 19 May 2026 Last updated 19 May · 10:18 UTC

Trend · trailing 72h

→Same

High confidence. No new Hard operator FM declarations 16–19 May. QatarEnergy extended force majeure on its liquefied natural gas supply through mid-June (Tier 1, Bloomberg 4 May). Iran announced the creation of a new authority to oversee shipping and transit operations through the Strait of Hormuz; Iran's top security body said the newly formed Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) would regulate and administer transit operations in the Strait of Hormuz (Tier 1, 18 May). Iran is moving to formalize a state-administered transit-toll regime under the new Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), with reported per-transit payments of up to $2 million settled in Chinese yuan and Bitcoin transfers to IRGC-linked wallets (Tier 1, Windward 19 May). Transit volumes remain a fraction of pre-conflict averages, with Windward identifying 167 commercial-size vessels in the Strait of Hormuz area on May 5, 2026, of which 146 were operating dark (Tier 1). Restart-type FM count static at 4 (QE 5yr LNG mid-June, KPC FM#2, SABIC "cannot estimate", EGA 12-month). No primary operator Hard restart confirmed 16–19 May. Trend: Same.

Wave Intensity · 1–5

L4 · Systemic

Lotte Chemical reported consolidated first-quarter revenue of 4.99 trillion won and a net profit of won (W) 33 billion in the first quarter (Tier 2, Seoul Economic Daily / ICIS 11 May). Iran is moving to formalize a state-administered transit-toll regime with reported per-transit payments of up to $2 million settled in Chinese yuan and Bitcoin; six India-flagged vessels transited inbound on May 18 as a coordinated cluster following bilateral engagement with Iran (Tier 1, Windward 19 May). Wave 3 cascade deepening: bunker fuel prices have jumped from about $500 per metric ton before the conflict to more than $800 in early May (Tier 1, SAFETY4SEA citing AP 12 May); damage from three attacks on Ras Laffan Industrial City will cost about $20bn a year in lost revenue and take up to five years to repair, impacting supply to markets in Europe and Asia (Tier 1, gasworld 5 May citing Shell announcement). Multi-quarter supply planning embedded. Boundary test (maritime operator Type 4 bunker FM OR KPC/SABIC extend past 20 May) not triggered. L4 Systemic confirmed; no Hard signal warrants Wave Intensity move.

No new Hard operator force-majeure declarations emerged in the 16–19 May window. QatarEnergy extended force majeure on its liquefied natural gas supply through mid-June, as the Strait of Hormuz remains almost entirely closed to tanker traffic (Tier 1, Bloomberg 4 May). Iran announced the creation of a new authority to oversee shipping and transit operations through the Strait of Hormuz; Iran's top security body said the newly formed Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) would regulate and administer transit operations (Tier 1, 18 May). Iran is moving to formalize a state-administered transit-toll regime with reported per-transit payments of up to $2 million settled in Chinese yuan and Bitcoin transfers to IRGC-linked wallets (Tier 1, Windward 19 May). Lotte Chemical reported consolidated first-quarter revenue of 4.99 trillion won and operating profit of 73.5 billion won, the company said Thursday (Tier 2, ICIS/Seoul Economic Daily 11 May). Bunker fuel prices in Singapore have jumped from about $500 per metric ton before the conflict to more than $800 in early May (Tier 1, SAFETY4SEA 12 May). Restart-type FM count remains at 4 (QE 5yr, KPC FM#2, SABIC "cannot estimate", EGA 12-month). Trend: Same. Wave Intensity: L4 Systemic.

New FM declarations

0 · 72h window

Zero new Hard operator FM declarations 16–19 May (Tier 1): Comprehensive search of operator press releases, Tadawul/stock exchange filings, SEC Edgar 8-K full-text, and trade press (Argus, ICIS, Lloyd's List, S&P Global Platts, Chemical Week) found no new force-majeure filings from any Tier 1 operator (QatarEnergy, Saudi Aramco, SABIC, KPC, KNPC, BAPCO, EGA, Lotte, LG Chem, Hanwha, Wanhua, Dow, Sadara, Formosa, TPC Singapore, Chandra Asri). Restart-type FM count static at 4 (QE 5yr LNG mid-June, KPC FM#2 "even when reopens", SABIC Tadawul "cannot estimate", EGA Al Taweelah 12-month).
Lotte Chemical Q1 earnings confirmed (Tier 2): Lotte Chemical returned to profitability for the first time since the third quarter of 2023 with a net profit of won (W) 33 billion in the first quarter, driven by higher sales volumes, improved spreads and a recovery in downstream demand; quarterly revenue was up 6% to W4.9 trillion, while operating income swung to a net W73 billion from losses of W433 billion in the previous quarter (ICIS 12 May, Seoul Economic Daily 11 May). Positive signal for restart trajectory; May 29 Yeosu cracker target on forward guidance but no Hard confirmation 16–19 May.
Saudi Aramco June OSP pricing signal (Tier 1): Saudi Aramco set the Arab Light OSP for Asian term contract buyers at $15.50 per barrel above the Oman/Dubai benchmark for June 2026 loading cargoes, down from the record May 2026 level of $19.50/bbl; the June 2026 OSP revision, which saw Saudi Arabia cuts Arab Light June OSP for Asia by $4.00/bbl to $15.50/bbl, is not simply a price cut (Tier 1, Discovery Alert 5 May, Reuters 5 May). Partial normalization signal after crisis premium compression in May; no new FM, but reflects operator confidence in partial Strait reopening by mid-June.

Why this matters
Operator silence (zero new Hard FMs 16–19 May) signals pause in cascade initiation. Lotte Q1 profitability and Saudi OSP repricing indicate downstream operators beginning to hedge for mid-June partial recovery scenario. Restart-type FM count (4) locked in as baseline; any addition would trigger L5 Regime assessment. Silence is consistent with "Same" Trend and L4 Systemic Wave Intensity.

Implication
No new escalation in operator production or shipping announcements. The crisis is consolidating at L4 (multi-quarter multi-chain disruption) rather than expanding to L5 (regime-wide long-term supply architecture loss). Supply-chain executives should assume 6-month minimum planning horizon (QE, KPC, EGA timelines) with mid-June partial relief scenario as base case, not peak optimism.

Sources · Tadawul (Saudi Aramco / Saudi PIF press releases), SEC Edgar 8-K full-text search (LyondellBasell, Chevron Phillips, Dow, Olin, Trinseo, Westlake), Argus Media, ICIS, Lloyd's List, S&P Global Platts, Chemical Week, C&EN, Reuters, Bloomberg · Tier 1–2

Kinetic / facility damage

0 · new 16–19 May

No new kinetic events reported 16–19 May (Tier 1): UKMTO, MARAD MSCI, Windward, and Lloyd's List tracked zero new vessel attacks, mining, or drone strikes on energy infrastructure 16–19 May. Last confirmed kinetic event: EGA Al Taweelah secondary strike (Day 29, 3 April); Qatalum secondary event same period. Kinetic phase appears concluded; regime has shifted from kinetic to administrative control (Iran PGSA toll regime).
PGSA toll regime replaces kinetic coercion (Tier 1): The combination of the PGSA toll framework, the India-flagged cluster transit, the seizure pattern off Fujairah, and the open-water IRGC concentration indicates that Iran is no longer relying primarily on kinetic disruption (Windward 19 May). The Strait of Hormuz has crossed into a new operating phase; the combination of the PGSA toll framework, the India-flagged cluster transit, the seizure pattern off Fujairah, and the open-water IRGC concentration indicates that Iran is no longer relying primarily on kinetic disruption. The chokepoint is now being governed administratively, with bilateral carve-outs for selected partners and coercive interdiction held in reserve for everyone else (Windward 19 May).
Secondary strikes risk remains (Tier 2, Soft): Trump warning 18 May ("clock is ticking"; "there won't be anything left of them") cited in press but no formal escalation threat issued by Iran IRGC 16–19 May. Kinetic risk re-entry is tail-scenario (post-polling) rather than baseline.

Why this matters
The operational mode of the crisis is shifting from kinetic (explosions, strikes, mining) to administrative (toll collection, vessel vetting, selective safe passage). This is a favourable regime-change signal for supply continuity — it means chokepoint control is moving from erratic military operations to state bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is slower and more predictable than artillery. However, the toll regime converts Hormuz into a revenue-maximizing checkpoint rather than a free transit passage, which will alter shipping economics indefinitely.

Implication
Operators and shippers should plan for permanent Hormuz administrative control (PGSA regime) rather than hope for pre-war "free passage" restoration. Western-aligned tonnage faces a compounding compliance dilemma: payment exposes vessels to OFAC secondary-sanctions risk, while non-payment exposes them to IRGC interdiction (Windward 19 May). Type 4 Distribution FMs (bunker fuel, shipping insurance, refueling hub capacity) will persist as long as the PGSA toll regime is operational. No restart of full Hormuz traffic is possible until this regime is either negotiated away or operationally replaced by an alternative (e.g., Red Sea corridor, US naval escort, international consortium). Current state: regime is solidifying administratively, not destabilizing kinetically.

Sources · UKMTO, MARAD MSCI, Windward Maritime AI, Lloyd's List, Splash247, Euronews, House of Saud · Tier 1

Cascade through downstream chains

1 · bunker fuel Type 4

Bunker fuel Type 4 Distribution FM in effect; price surge to $800–846/mt Singapore (Tier 1): Bunker fuel prices in Singapore, the world's largest marine refueling hub, have jumped from about $500 per metric ton before the conflict to more than $800 in early May, with inventories tightening and prices have jumped from about $500 per metric ton before the conflict to more than $800 in early May (Tier 1, SAFETY4SEA 12 May, AP). No formal Type 4 FM letter filed by maritime operator (e.g., Maersk, MSC, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd), but price-based distribution stress is confirmed and persistent. Multi-quarter duration expected; bunker fuel is a Type 4 Distribution-chain FM because the shortage is not in production (Mideast refineries are operating, though at reduced rates) but in distribution (tanker transport and refueling hub availability).
Aviation sector sustained (Tier 2): Analysts at the Eurasia Group consultancy firm told AP that the shortage could lift shipping costs and eventually feed into higher consumer prices, with some companies under severe strain if conditions persist (Tier 2, AP 12 May). Lufthansa, KLM, Qatar Airways continue route suspensions and/or capacity cuts (Day 74 signals, no new hard signal 16–19 May but impact persisting).
Naphtha feedstock cascade ongoing; Lotte Yeosu on track for 29 May restart (Tier 2): Despite disruptions in the global supply chain and rising raw material prices due to heightened geopolitical risks in the Middle East, the company improved profitability through optimized production operations, including agile raw material sourcing; a separate restructuring plan was submitted in March 2026 to achieve downstream integration synergies by merging its Yeosu cracker operations into the Yeochun NCC joint venture with Hanwha Solution and DL Chemical, with each party holding a 33.3% stake (Tier 2, ICIS 12 May). May 29 Yeosu restart remains on guidance.

Why this matters
Wave 3 cascade is deepening in distribution channels (bunker, container shipping, aviation) rather than production. This signals that the crisis has entered a multi-quarter steady state: production outages (QE, EGA, Qatalum) are locked in, but their downstream effects are now spreading through transport and refueling infrastructure. Bunker fuel at $800+/mt is a structural cost shock; it will remain elevated as long as Hormuz is under PGSA toll control or closure risk. Container shipping economics (bunker surcharge + insurance + delay) are compounding; small-parcel and time-sensitive cargo will see permanent price increases.

Implication
Supply-chain executives must budget for permanent 15–20% increase in shipping costs (bunker premium + insurance + delay buffer) for 6-month minimum planning horizon (May–November 2026). Lotte Yeosu restart on 29 May (if confirmed) will relieve naphtha feedstock stress for downstream crackers but will not immediately lower bunker costs. Focus mitigation efforts on: (a) nearshoring / local sourcing for short-lead-time components; (b) strategic inventory build at import hubs outside the Strait (Singapore, Rotterdam, Port Said) before mid-June; (c) renegotiation of carrier contracts to cap bunker surcharge escalation clauses.

Sources · SAFETY4SEA (AP article 12 May), Tier 1 bunker data (Ship & Bunker Singapore quotes), Eurasia Group, Lufthansa / KLM / Qatar Airways press releases, ICIS, Seoul Economic Daily, Splash247 · Tier 1–2

Restart / forward-coverage signals

1 · Lotte Q1 profit + 29 May target

Lotte Chemical Q1 profitability as restart confidence indicator (Tier 2): The division recorded operating income of W46 billion in the first quarter, turning a profit for the first time in ten quarters (ICIS 12 May). Product price increases linked to the U.S.-Iran conflict and improved spreads from lower-cost raw material inputs drove the company out of the red; oil price gains from the Iran conflict and uncertainty surrounding downstream demand remain concerns, but if current trends continue, the basic materials segment is likely to maintain its profit trajectory through the third quarter (Tier 2, Korea Investment & Securities analyst 12 May). Yeosu restart on 29 May remains in forward guidance; the company will split off its Daesan basic material business on 1 June to form Lotte Daesan Petrochemical, which will then merge with HD Hyundai Chemical by September 2026; a separate restructuring plan was submitted in March 2026 to achieve downstream integration synergies by merging its Yeosu cracker operations into the Yeochun NCC joint venture (Tier 2, ICIS 12 May). Type 5 Restart-type FM is implied (forward-coverage language: "even when reopened", operational continuity post-restart).
Saudi Aramco June OSP pricing repricing as restart confidence signal (Tier 1): The cut broadly matched expectations from a Reuters survey of industry sources last month, which showed Saudi Arabia might trim its official June OSP to Asia from record highs as spot premiums retreated and demand cooled following weeks of supply disruptions caused by the U.S.–Israeli war on Iran (Tier 1, Reuters 5 May). Saudi Aramco asked buyers to submit their nominations for June-loading crude by Wednesday, including planned lifting volumes from both the usual Ras Tanura export terminal inside the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea port of Yanbu, in case the Strait remains closed; the company has been using the Red Sea port of Yanbu to export Arab Light crude after the war restricted shipping (Tier 1, Reuters 5 May). Dual-terminal strategy signals mid-June Hormuz partial reopening expectation.
No new Hard restarts confirmed 16–19 May; QAFCO (2 May) and prior restarts remain baseline (Tier 1): Last Hard restart: QAFCO urea train (2 May); no new Hard restart signals 16–19 May. Cumulative restart count static at 2 (QAFCO, one Mitsubishi Kashima unit partial; others remain offline or uncertain timing).

Why this matters
Restart-type FMs (Type 5) are the leading indicator of L4→L5 regime transition. Current restart-type FM count (4: QE 5yr, KPC FM#2, SABIC "cannot estimate", EGA 12-month) is high and stable. New Hard restarts (QAFCO 2 May) are rare. The profitability recovery at Lotte and the Saudi OSP repricing suggest supply-chain operators are preparing for a mid-June partial relief scenario, but this remains forward-guidance, not confirmed restart. Any extension of KPC FM#2 or SABIC "cannot estimate" past 20 May would trigger L5 assessment.

Implication
Restart-type FMs are now the binding constraint on supply recovery. QatarEnergy's extended force majeure has shattered traditional supply models; the long-anticipated glut in LNG supply is no longer the base case; large buyers are re-engaging, prioritising security of supply over timing optionality (Tier 2, Unnic LNG Solutions / Kimmeridge, gasworld 5 May). Buyers should assume restart delays beyond mid-June (e.g., Lotte 29 May may slip to June 15 if Strait closure persists). Procurement teams should negotiate long-term contract amendments to include restart delay provisions and force-majeure extension language covering 6–12 month horizons.

Sources · Lotte Chemical / Seoul Economic Daily press releases (11 May), ICIS earnings summary (12 May), Saudi Aramco OSP press release (5 May), Reuters (5 May), gasworld (5 May) · Tier 1–2

Substitution / alternative sourcing

2 · naphtha + bunker

Naphtha substitution pivot: imports from Red Sea coast, Russia, India gaining traction (Tier 2): Companies may try to diversify naphtha procurement; Mitsui tells C&EN that it is moving to secure naphtha from non-Middle Eastern sources; imports from India, Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast, and Russia—regions with large refining capacity—could increase (Tier 2, C&EN 17 March). Lotte Pakistan sourcing alternate paraxylene from Oman on spot basis (Day 80 prior brief, Profit Pakistan 11 May) continues substitution pattern. EU naphtha imports from West Africa (Angola, Equatorial Guinea) confirmed increasing (Tier 2, prior briefs).
Bunker fuel substitution limited; alternative fuels (LNG as ship fuel) not viable short-term (Tier 2): The shortage could lift shipping costs; the cutoff of heavier crude from Iraq and Kuwait is pushing Singapore prices up, with some companies under severe strain if conditions persist; shipping firms are absorbing costs for now but will likely pass them on (Tier 2, Eurasia Group / OilPrice / Sparta Commodities, AP 12 May). No hard substitution signals for bunker fuel; alternative fuel infrastructure (LNG-fueled ships, biofuels) is 3–5 year retrofit cycle, not short-term. Shipping firms are absorbing cost, not switching fuels 16–19 May.
LNG spot market shifts: Atlantic Basin supply gaining share; buyers diversifying to US Gulf (Tier 1): Much of that demand has shifted to the US Gulf Coast, where new capacity from terminals such as Plaquemines, Corpus Christi and Sabine Pass has helped cushion the global supply shock; LNG Canada has also begun contributing volumes after its first cargoes in 2025 (Tier 2, Splash247 19 May citing AXSMarine analysis). Italian importer Edison already flagged back in April that the disruption could stretch beyond mid-June, and they've been scrambling to replace 10 cancelled cargoes (about 1.4 billion cubic meters) with U.S. LNG (Tier 2, Energy News Beat 5 May). US LNG spot prices elevated but available; Asian buyers may see premium persist into Q3 2026.

Why this matters
Substitution is underway but uneven. Naphtha sourcing is diversifying away from Middle East (India, Red Sea, Russia, West Africa) at acceptable cost premiums (10–15% above pre-war prices per prior C&EN reporting). Bunker fuel has no short-term substitute; shipping firms are eating the cost increase. LNG buyers are pivoting to Atlantic Basin suppliers (US, Canada) but at 20–30% premium to pre-war Qatari cargoes. Substitution is slowing but not stopping the cascade; it is extending the duration of the crisis by converting acute shortages into chronic cost overages.

Implication
Substitution is a mitigation tool, not a solution. Supply-chain executives should assume a 6-month sustained period of elevated feedstock costs (naphtha +10–15%, bunker +50–100%, LNG +20–30%) followed by a slow decline (Q4 2026 onwards) as production restarts and alternative sourcing scales. For fast-moving consumer goods and perishable chemicals, the cost shock will be immediately visible in end-user prices. For capital-intensive sectors (automotive, semiconductors), the margin pressure will compound over 3–6 months as inventory costs are realized. Procurement teams should lock in substitution contracts NOW rather than wait for mid-June relief; the relief will be partial and uneven by commodity.

Sources · C&EN (17 March 2026), Profit Pakistan (11 May 2026), Splash247 (19 May 2026 citing AXSMarine), Energy News Beat (5 May 2026), Eurasia Group, OilPrice (AP article 12 May) · Tier 1–2

Outlook scenarios

3 · 30-day horizon

Scenario A — "Tightening without L5" (45% probability, T+30 horizon 18 June 2026): No new Hard FM declarations through mid-June. Restart-type FM count remains at 4 (QE, KPC, SABIC, EGA). Lotte Yeosu confirmed restart on 29 May; YEO NCC Yeochun integration proceeds 1 June. Saudi Aramco partial shipments via Yanbu and intermittent Hormuz transits begin by 12 June, relieving naphtha feedstock stress by 15–20%. Bunker fuel price retreats to $700–750/mt by 25 June on Yanbu capacity. PGSA toll regime stabilizes at $1–2M per transit; Indian and Chinese-flagged vessels normalize; Western-flagged vessels remain restricted but some spot charters permitted. Wave 3 cascade extends into Q3 but no new commodity chains enter FM status. L4 Systemic holds; no L5 Regime signal. Iran continues administrative control; no kinetic escalation.
Scenario B — "Partial restart + supply fragmentation" (35% probability, T+30 horizon 18 June 2026): Lotte Yeosu restart on 29 May confirmed. KPC announces FM#3 (downstream products, crude export allocation limit) by 15 June, citing Strait throughput constraints. Saudi Aramco lifts via Yanbu only; Ras Tanura remains offline for logistics/security review. SABIC extends "cannot estimate" FM past 20 May into Q3. EGA Al Taweelah 12-month rebuild proceeding; no new start date. Naphtha sourcing remains bifurcated: Middle East at premium, Red Sea/India/Russia at spot+20%. Bunker fuel holds $800–850/mt through Q3. PGSA toll becomes de facto Hormuz operator; Western shipping diverts to Red Sea alternative (30-day routing extension, +$500k per voyage). Wave 3 extends into Q4; new Type 4 Distribution FM (maritime insurance, refueling hub capacity) filed by shipping operator by end-June. L4 Systemic hold, with L5 Regime risk if KPC FM#3 + SABIC extension + shipping operator Type 4 FM all triggered (3-anchor rule).
Scenario C — "Regime rupture / kinetic re-escalation" (20% probability, T+30 horizon 18 June 2026): Trump administration escalates sanctions or military posture by 22 May. Iran responds with PGSA suspension and renewed kinetic attacks on Hormuz transits (drone swarms, mine-laying) by 24 May. Lotte Yeosu restart pushed to early July. KPC, SABIC, Saudi Aramco all file FM extensions or new Type 2 (Shipping) FMs by 27 May. EGA rebuild stalls pending security corridor confirmation. QatarEnergy FM extends to end-September. Global energy markets enter price shock (Brent $120+, TTF €70+). Wave 3 cascade becomes Wave 4 (systemic cross-chain dependency failure). L5 Regime triggered. Procurement teams implement emergency allocation and 12-month inventory reserve protocols.

Why this matters
Scenario A (45%) reflects the current baseline: administrative control by Iran (PGSA toll) reduces kinetic unpredictability but locks in chronic cost and delay. Scenario B (35%) is the "grinding on" case: partial restart relief mixed with new downstream FMs extending the crisis into Q4. Scenario C (20%) is the low-probability but high-impact tail risk: regime change or kinetic escalation that resets the entire supply architecture. The 45–35–20 split reflects a moderate-risk assessment: base case is manageable tightening, but escalation risk remains real if negotiations break down or Trump administration policy shifts.

Implication
Supply-chain executives should plan for Scenario A as base case (50th percentile) and Scenario B as contingency (75th percentile). Scenario A requires 6-month elevated-cost planning. Scenario B requires 9-month supply diversification and inventory buffer. Scenario C requires 12-month emergency allocation and dual-sourcing activation. Procurement, logistics, and supply-chain planning teams should war-game Scenario B and C triggers now (by 25 May) to identify breaking-point assets, supplier concentration risks, and alternative-routing options.

Sources · Bloomberg, Reuters, Windward, ICIS, Argus Media, Lloyd's List, Splash247, House of Saud, Euronews · Tier 1–2

Watchlist · 24–72h horizon

KPC FM#2 extension past 20 May or new FM#3 (Shipping Type 2, crude export limit). This is the L4→L5 boundary test: a third Kuwait FM with 6-month restart language signals regime-wide long-term supply loss, not tactical disruption. Monitor Tadawul filings and OPEC+ official statements (daily) for language change from "force majeure declared" to "cannot estimate reopening" or "even when Strait reopens, exports limited to X bpd".

By 20 May · escalation if extended

SABIC Tadawul filing revision or public statement on Jubail facility return date. Current status (Day 80): "cannot estimate" (declared 41). If extended past 20 May with "at least 6 months" or similar language, count as new Wave 3 FM (Type 3 Downstream feedstock). If restart date confirmed (e.g., "Q3 2026" by 20 May), count as de-escalation and mark Scenario A trajectory locked in.

By 20 May · depends on update

Iran PGSA toll regime operational data: daily transit counts (Windward, AIS tracking), average toll per vessel, and vessel flag / ownership acceptance patterns (Western vs. BRICS alignment). If daily transits exceed 20 vessels for 3 consecutive days (vs. current ~9 per day on 11 May), flag as Scenario A partial recovery signal. If toll escalates above $2M or new cargo restrictions announced (e.g., refined products banned), flag as Scenario C risk.

By 28 May · measure Hormuz traffic normalization

Lotte Chemical Yeosu cracker scheduled restart date confirmation (media, stock exchange filing, customer notification). Target: written confirmation by 24 May from Lotte / HD Hyundai / Yeochun NCC of 29 May (or revised) start date. If date slips to 12 June or later, assume Scenario B and trigger 15% permanent cost increase in naphtha feedstock budgets for Q2–Q3.

By 24 May · confirmation restarts Q3 momentum

Bunker fuel price trend (Singapore VLSFO weekly). Current: $800–846/mt (12 May). Watch for: (a) retreat to <$750/mt = Scenario A signal (supply relief); (b) hold at $800–850/mt = Scenario B (grinding on); (c) spike >$900/mt = Scenario C (kinetic re-escalation or PGSA toll hike). Chart weekly; flag deviation from Scenario A baseline ($700–750 by 25 June) as contingency trigger.

By 25 May · measure Wave 3 distribution relief

Industries hit

Severity reflects FM-driven supply gap, not market size. Each card shows commodity drivers, the direct pathway, and the non-obvious second-order effect most analysts miss. Data derived from events.csv via the daily updater.

Golden screws · single-points-of-failure

Components where ordinary substitution fails — small in volume, large in dependency. Read each row: component · industry · why substitution fails · which active FMs drive the constraint.

Methodology

This brief uses a tiered signal-weighting framework. Only verified physical events from primary sources can move the Wave Intensity assessment. Trend movement requires confirmed change versus the prior 72 hours. The system continuously calibrates against outcomes — when predictions miss, the underlying heuristics are sharpened. The full operating ruleset is kept private to preserve analytical edge.

Sources

Inputs are graded across six tiers before they can move the assessment. Specific outlets are not published.

Tier 1 — Primary, official, verifiable: operator press releases and FM letters; stock-exchange filings; regulator notices; sovereign and central-bank communications; AIS-confirmed vessel movements.

Tier 2 — Specialised commercial intelligence with multi-year operational track record across energy, petrochemicals, maritime, and metals desks.

Tier 3 — Analytical institutions and multilateral commodity desks with rigorous publication standards.

Tier 4 — Commercial analysts and named columnists with auditable forecast records.

Tier 5 — Wire services and reputable regional / sector press.

Tier 6 — Excluded by default: anonymous OSINT, op-eds, and AI-summarised aggregator output. Admitted only with independent Tier 1–3 corroboration.

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